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Examining the extent of and drivers for materiality assessment disclosures in 
sustainability reports 
Abstract 
Purpose: This paper evaluates the extent of materiality assessment disclosures in sustainability 
reports and their determinants. The study examines the disclosure practices of listed companies 
based in the member states of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, 
colloquially referred to as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).  
Design/methodology: Firstly, the materiality assessment disclosures were scored through a 
content analysis of sustainability reports published by listed GCC companies during a five-year 
period from 2013 to 2017. Secondly, a fixed effect ordered logic regression was used to 
examine the determinants of materiality assessment disclosures. 
Findings: While sustainability reporting rates improved across the sample period, a significant 
majority of listed GCC companies do not engage in sustainability reporting. The use of 
internationally recognised standards has also declined. While reporters provide more 
information on their materiality assessment, the number of sustainability reports that offer 
information on how the reporter identifies material issues has declined. These trends potentially 
indicate the existence of managerial capture. Materiality assessment disclosure scores are 
positively influenced by higher financial performance (Return on Assets), lower leverage and 
better corporate governance. However, company size and market-to-book ratio do not influence 
materiality assessment disclosures.  
Practical implications: The findings may prove useful to managers responsible for preparing 
sustainability reports who can benefit from the examples of materiality assessment disclosures. 
An evaluation of the materiality assessment should be included in the scope of assurance 
engagements and practitioners can use the examples of best practice when evaluating 
sustainability reports. Stock exchanges may consider developing improved corporate 
governance guidelines as these will lead to materiality assessment disclosures. 
Social implications: The findings may assist in improving sustainability reporting quality, 
through better materiality assessment disclosures. This will allow corporate stakeholders to 
evaluate the reporting entities underlying processes, which leads to transparency and corporate 
accountability. Improved corporate sustainability reporting supports the GCC commitment to 




Originality: This study addresses the call for greater research examining materiality within a 
sustainability reporting context. This is the first paper to examine sustainability reporting 
quality in the GCC region, focusing particularly on materiality assessment disclosures. 
Key terms: materiality assessment; sustainability reporting; corporate governance; managerial 
capture; Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 





Organisations play a key role in supporting societies’ ambition of sustainable development 
(Bebbington, 2001; Gray, 2010). To demonstrate their commitment to sustainability, 
organisations undertake sustainability reporting, in which they provide stakeholders with 
information on the social, environmental and economic impact of their operations1 (Global 
Reporting Initiative, n.d.). While sustainability reporting is now a global norm (KPMG, 2017), 
critics complain that sustainability reporting is subject to managerial capture (O’Dwyer, 2003; 
Owen et al., 1997; Owen et al., 2000), whereby reporters primarily discuss positive 
performance (good news) while providing little to no information on negative performance 
(bad news) (Zaman et al., 2020). Such poor quality sustainability reports act as a façade hiding 
corporate hypocrisy (Cho et al., 2015; Howard et al., 2019; Maroun, 2018) and thereby 
preventing sustainability reporting from achieving its goal of promoting transparency and 
corporate sustainability accountability (Adams, 2004, 2015; Adams & Larrinaga‐González, 
2007; Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Gray, 2010). 
To reduce the likelihood of managerial capture and improve the quality of sustainability 
reporting, international standard setters, such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), 
recommend that reporters should undertake a materiality assessment to identify issues that are 
material to the reporting entity and its stakeholders (Global Reporting Initiative, n.d.). This 
would ensure that material issues are identified, and reporters publish high-quality 
sustainability reports. In sustainability reporting, materiality is the principle that determines 
which relevant topics are sufficiently important that it is essential to report on them (Global 
Reporting Initiative, 2016, p. 10). A materiality assessment is a process of identifying 
economic, social and environmental issues that are material to the company and its stakeholders 
(Global Reporting Initiative, 2015; Jones et al., 2016; Lydenberg, 2012). Importantly, standard 
setters and practitioners recommend that reporters disclose their materiality assessment within 
their sustainability reports - that is, provide information on how they undertook their materiality 
assessment (Global Reporting Initiative, 2013, 2016). This would allow report users to 
understand and evaluate the process used by the reporter in identifying material issues and why 
some material issues are discussed in the sustainability report while others are not. Report users 
could also compare the process against the requirements of international standards and 
disclosures made by other companies to evaluate whether the reporter is following best 
 
1 Some organisations opt to publish stand-alone sustainability reports while others prefer to include information 
on their sustainability performance in a single annual report. For the purpose of this study the term ‘sustainability 




practices.2 This would reduce the likelihood of managerial capture and improve the quality of 
sustainability reports. Ultimately, this will lead to improved stakeholder confidence in 
published sustainability reports and promote greater corporate transparency and accountability.  
However, studies examining materiality within a sustainability reporting context remain scarce 
(Unerman & Zappettini, 2014). Researchers have commented on the conceptualisation of 
materiality in non-financial reporting (Eccles et al., 2012; Fasan & Mio, 2017; Lydenberg, 
2012; Mio & Fasan, 2013). For example, Eccles et al. (2012) evaluate US companies’ climate 
change-related disclosures in response to new reporting requirements issued by the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (effective since February 2010). Disappointed by the 
quality of these disclosures, Eccles et al. (2012) suggest that regulators and standard setters 
need to introduce sector-specific guidance on which sustainability indicators are material and 
should be reported. Others have focused their attention on how the materiality assessment 
should be undertaken. For example, Calabrese et al. (2015) offer insights into the use of 
analytical tools for evaluating customer feedback on sustainability reports. Similarly, Calabrese 
et al. (2016) suggest the use of an analytical model to help reporters evaluate stakeholder 
perceptions on the relative importance (i.e. material versus not material) of GRI aspects and 
indicators3. Hsu et al. (2013), using a case study methodology, develop a materiality assessment 
model, based on stakeholder perceptions. Farooq and De Villiers (2019b) interview 
sustainability reporting managers and present insights into five stages of the institutionalisation 
of sustainability reporting (including the materiality assessment process) within reporting 
organisations. However, none of these studies evaluate the extent of reporter’s materiality 
assessment disclosures i.e. the information provided by the reporter on how they undertook 
their materiality assessment. Exceptions include Jones et al. (2016), who critique the 
materiality assessment disclosures contained within the 2015 sustainability reports published 
by the top 10 UK retail companies. However, this study does not provide a comparative 
analysis of the extent of materiality assessment disclosures across time, nor does it explore the 
determinants of materiality assessment disclosures. Beske et al. (2020) examine the extent of 
 
2 This argument rests on the assumption that users have a basic understanding of sustainability reporting. However, 
the same assumption is made in financial reporting, where users are assumed to have a reasonable understanding 
of business, economics and accounting to be able to understand the information provided in a set of financial 
statements. As sustainability reporting becomes more widespread it is reasonable to assume that users’ 
understanding of such reports (and their related standards) will also improve. Additionally, it is worth noting that 
there is a risk that a reporter’s materiality assessment claims/disclosure are not reliable; i.e. what is disclosed does 
not reflect what was done. However, the same risk exists in financial reporting and is addressed (with some 
success) through the annual financial audit. Similarly, the growth of sustainability assurance (i.e. external 
assurance of sustainability reports) is designed to improve the reliability of sustainability reports (Farooq and De 
Villiers, 2017, 2018).   




materiality assessment disclosures in a sample of German listed companies using a binary 
scoring index. They find that reporters disclose limited information on their materiality 
assessment. Using legitimacy theory, they argue that a materiality analysis can be strategically 
misused to define sustainability report content without considering the interests of 
stakeholders. They argue that managers must acknowledge the importance of materiality 
assessment disclosures, as failure to do so would call into question the overall reliability of the 
information presented. However, the study is limited to analysing the extent of materiality 
assessment disclosures. They recommend that future researchers move beyond a binary index 
to allow for a more granular analysis of disclosures.  
Furthermore, while research into the sustainability disclosure practices of reporters based in 
developed countries has improved in recent years, there remains a need for greater research 
focusing on developing countries in the Middle East and Africa (Amran & Haniffa, 2011; 
Beske et al., 2020; Gerged et al., 2018; Zaman et al., 2018). The Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) of the Middle East comprises of the states of Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Three reasons support 
greater academic effort targeting the disclosure practices of companies based in this region. 
First, the economic, political and social importance of the GCC region must be recognised. The 
region has a significant global environmental footprint with implications for global warming 
and climate change (WWF, 2012). Second, the GCC states have indicated their commitment 
to the UN SDGs, e.g. the KSA’s ‘Vision for 2030’ which incorporates the UN SDGs. Academic 
research focusing on this region has the potential to assist regulators, reporters and practitioners 
in improving sustainability reporting so that can produce high-quality sustainability reporting 
that promotes transparency and corporate accountability). Third, while sustainability reporting 
rates in developed countries have increased dramatically in recent years (KPMG, 2015, 2017), 
developing countries (in comparison to developed western states) are still relatively new to 
sustainability reporting. Consequently, researchers will be able to identify greater variations in 
disclosure quality when examining sustainability reports published by companies based in 
these countries.    
The few studies that have explored sustainability reporting amongst Middle Eastern nations 
tend to focus on how much information is provided (Gerged et al., 2018). However, with the 
introduction of GRI G4 in 2013, the emphasis has now shifted from providing more 
information (as a trait of better-quality sustainability reports) to providing better disclosure 
only on material issues (Global Reporting Initiative, 2013). Therefore, this study seeks to 
address these gaps in the literature by addressing two research questions: (i) what is the extent 
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of material assessment disclosures and (ii) what corporate characteristics (including corporate 
financial performance, corporate leverage, corporate governance and company size) influence 
materiality assessment disclosures scores? 
To evaluate the extent of materiality assessment disclosures, a content analysis of sustainability 
reports was carried out over a sample of 704 listed GCC companies for a five-year period (2013 
to 2017). The determinants of materiality assessment disclosures were examined using a fixed 
effect order logic regression analysis.  
The study finds that while sustainability reporting rates in the GCC have increased, a significant 
majority did not engage in sustainability reporting. For example, in 2017, 60% of listed GCC 
companies did not engage in sustainability reporting. There is a decline in the use of the GRI 
guidelines, with only 8.2% of sustainability reports referring to internationally recognised 
standards. The number of sustainability reports containing information on the reporter’s 
materiality assessment declined from 10.2% in 2013 to 8.6% in 2017. However, despite this 
downward trend, materiality assessment disclosures improved in the region with the average 
materiality assessment disclosure score moving from 2.39 in 2013 to 3.08 in 2017. 
Nevertheless, overall findings reveal that listed GCC companies fail to inform their 
stakeholders on the process they use for identifying material issues for inclusion within the 
sustainability report. Arguably, by not providing this information, reporters are able to avoid 
outside scrutiny over their underlying reporting processes and can maintain their control over 
the sustainability reporting agenda, leaving the reporting process open to managerial capture.  
Despite this general lack of transparency, there are GCC listed companies that voluntarily 
disclose information on their materiality assessment. Regression analysis was used to find out 
what corporate characteristics influence companies disclosing information on their materiality 
assessment. Our regression results show that high financial performance (i.e. high Return on 
Assets), lower corporate leverage, and better corporate governance (including board 
independence) significantly increase corporate materiality assessment disclosure scores. 
However, we found that company size and market-to-book ratio is not associated with 
materiality assessment disclosures. 
The study fills a gap in the literature by contributing to research on sustainability reporting 
quality, focusing specifically on materiality assessment disclosures. First, we uncover the 
relevant antecedents of materiality assessment disclosure scores that, despite their significance 
in determining materiality assessment disclosures, were absent in prior studies. These 
determinants are derived from the sustainability reporting/social and environmental accounting 
literature as well as the broader corporate governance literature. Second, given the dearth of 
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studies examining sustainability reporting in the Middle East, this study offers a novel context 
and assists in building our understanding of disclosures practices in the GCC region. 
These findings may prove useful to practitioners responsible for preparing and assuring 
sustainability reports – the sustainability reporting managers and sustainability assurance 
providers. Sustainability reporting managers can benefit from the examples of best practice in 
materiality assessment disclosures which can assist in improving the quality of their 
disclosures. From a sustainability assurance perspective, an evaluation of a reporter’s 
materiality assessment should be included within the scope of sustainability assurance 
engagements. The examples of materiality assessment disclosures will assist assurance 
practitioners in evaluating corporate sustainability reports.  
The findings of this study have policy implications. Stock exchanges should consider 
introducing tougher corporate governance requirements, as we found corporate governance 
quality (board structures and use of international reporting standards) improves materiality 
assessment disclosures. Improved materiality assessment disclosures have societal 
implications as it allows corporate stakeholders to understand and evaluate the process used by 
sustainability reporters in identifying material issues for reporting. Ultimately corporate 
stakeholders will benefit from the likely reduction in managerial capture, improved 
sustainability report quality and increased corporate transparency and accountability. These 
developments have implications for the GCC states in supporting their goal of implementing 
the UN SDGs and transitioning to a more sustainable growth path.    
The remainder of this paper consists of a literature review (section two), theoretical framework 
(section three), research method (section four), findings and analysis (section five), discussion 
(section six) and conclusion (section seven).  
2 Literature review  
Materiality is a well-known and central concept in the accounting world (Fasan & Mio, 2017; 
Mio & Fasan, 2013). Accountants use materiality to guide them in preparing financial 
statements and financial auditors rely on materiality in planning and performing their audit. 
However, there is no universally agreed upon definition for materiality4 (Eccles & Krzus, 2014; 
Edgley, 2014). According to the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), a sub-
board of the International Financial Reporting Standards Foundation (IFRS Foundation), 
 
4 As Edgley (2014) remarks, the lack of a definition does not prevent the term from achieving what it sets out to 
achieve. Eccles and Krzus (2014) point out that the U.S. courts intentionally avoid providing any definition for 
materiality, as they do for fraud. Instead what is material and what is immaterial is decided on a case by case basis 
by considering both quantitative and qualitative information. Importantly, the process of determining materiality 
must be made with complete clarity. 
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“information is material if omitting it or misstating it could influence decisions that … users of 
… financial reports make on the basis of those reports, which provide financial information 
about a specific reporting entity” (IASB, 2018, p. 15). The International Standards on Auditing 
(ISAs), published by the International Audit and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), 
describe materiality as “misstatements including omissions, are considered to be material if 
they, individually or in the aggregate, could reasonably be expected to influence the economic 
decisions of users taken on the basis of the financial statements” (IAASB, 2009, p. 314). 
Thus, materiality acts as a threshold below which an item is considered immaterial (i.e. does 
not influence the economic decisions of financial report users) and above which an item is 
considered material (i.e. does influence the economic decisions of financial report users) 
(Eccles & Krzus, 2014). As information can be material in nature and/or magnitude, 
accountants must consider both qualitative and quantitative factors when making their 
assessments. The IASB, in its 2018 Conceptual Framework, also states that materiality is an 
“entity-specific” concept (IASB, 2018, p. 14), and therefore it cannot prescribe a single 
threshold for materiality for use by all reporting entities; that is, what is material for one entity 
may not be material for another.  
2.1 Materiality in sustainability reporting 
As is the case in the accounting world, there is no consensus on the definition of materiality 
within sustainability reporting (Jones et al., 2016; KPMG, 2014). However, this is where the 
similarity ends, as materiality in accounting represents a relatively narrow short-term financial 
perspective drawn from a set of historical financial statements and underlying accounting 
records (AccountAbility, 2013; Global Reporting Initiative, 2013), whereas materiality in 
sustainability reporting draws on a broader range of stakeholders, incorporates both backward 
and forward-looking dimensions, and integrates with the organisation’s overall strategy 
(AccountAbility, 2013). 
Responding to criticisms of promoting a tick-the-box approach to sustainability reporting 
(Moneva et al., 2006), the GRI launched its G4 guidelines in 2013. The new guidelines 
emphasised the importance of materiality and were designed to ensure that sustainability 
reports are relevant to the information needs of stakeholders (Global Reporting Initiative, 
2013). In defining materiality, the GRI explains that “the report should cover aspects that: 
reflect the organization’s significant economic, environmental and social impacts; or 
substantively influence the assessments and decisions of stakeholders” (Global Reporting 
Initiative, 2016, p. 6). In 2016 the GRI launched a set of standards to replace G45 (applicable 
 
5 The GRI G4 guidelines were applicable from 2015 until mid-2018 (GRI, 2013).  
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from 1 July 2018). However, the principles outlined in G4 have been retained. Principles 
around sustainability report content (what to report on) include (1) stakeholder inclusiveness 
(identifying and responding to stakeholders’ interests); (2) sustainability context (reporting on 
sustainability performance in relation to the broader local, regional and global sustainability 
context); (3) materiality (ensuring disclosure on issues6  significant to the reporter and its 
stakeholders); and (4) completeness (ensuring coverage of all material) (Global Reporting 
Initiative, 2016).  
2.2 Materiality assessment process 
Materiality is often presented as a binary concept; an issue is either material (reported on) or 
immaterial (not reported on) (Eccles & Krzus, 2014). However, undertaking a materiality 
assessment is highly complex and inherently subjective. The principle of materiality in 
AccountAbility, 2018 AP1100 states that “Materiality relates to identifying and prioritising the 
most relevant sustainability topics, taking into account the effect each topic has on an 
organisation and its stakeholders. A material topic is a topic that will substantively influence 
and impact the assessments, decisions, actions and performance of an organisation and/or its 
stakeholders in the short, medium and/or long term” (AccountAbility, 2018, p. 20). For the 
purpose of this study, the term ‘materiality assessment’ is used. Such an assessment requires 
reporters to consider a range of internal and external sources of information, and by engaging 
with a wide range of stakeholders, to identify and evaluate material issues for reporting 
(AccountAbility, 2008, 2011; Global Reporting Initiative, 2016). The materiality assessment 
process is described in AccountAbility (2018) as determining the relevance and significance of 
an issue to an organisation and its stakeholder.  
KPMG (2014, p. 4) provides a seven-step approach to conducting a materiality assessment: 
1. Define scope and purpose: “Define what materiality means for your organization and 
be clear about your objectives and audience.” 
2. Identify potential topics: “Create a long-list of potential material topics.” 
3. Categorize topics: “Refine the long-list of potential material topics by clustering them 
into categories.” 
4. Gather information on impact and importance: “Explore each material topic in detail to 
understand its relevance to the business and stakeholders.” 
 
6 The GRI prefer to use the term aspect within their guidelines and list 4 types of economic aspects, 12 types of 
environmental aspects and 4 sub-categories of social aspects (each sub-category then comprises of different types 
of aspects).  
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5. Prioritize: “Prioritise material topics based on the strategic importance to the business, 
importance to stakeholders and the social, economic and environmental impact of each topic 
in the value chain.” 
6. Engage management: “Test the results of your materiality assessment with key internal 
audiences to validate the outcome.” 
7. Seek stakeholder feedback: “Follow up with stakeholders to get feedback on the 
material topics reported.” 
The G4 guidelines explain that this process involves four steps (Global Reporting Initiative, 
2013). Step one, identification, involves identifying material issues and is achieved by applying 
the principles of sustainability context and stakeholder inclusiveness. Step two, prioritization, 
requires the ranking of issues to assess which are the most significant and is achieved by 
applying the principles of materiality and stakeholder inclusiveness. Step three, validation, 
involves validating the results of step three and is achieved by applying the principles of 
completeness and stakeholder inclusiveness. Finally, step four, review, involves undertaking a 
post-publication review of the sustainability report with the aim of assessing whether the 
principles of stakeholder inclusiveness and stakeholder engagement were applied and how to 
refine step one in the next reporting cycle. Although this four-step process does not feature in 
the new GRI standards, much of the content (especially the principles) is still the same. The 
GRI notes that a reporter may identify numerous material issues. However, “[n]ot all material 
topics are of equal importance, and the emphasis within a report is expected to reflect their 
relative priority” (Global Reporting Initiative, 2016). 
The actual responsibility for carrying out a materiality assessment is up to the reporting entity. 
Specifically, it is the fiduciary duty of the board of directors (boards) to undertake a materiality 
assessment (Eccles & Krzus, 2014). Furthermore, materiality is a social construct, or as Eccles 
and Krzus (2014) describe it, materiality is a “firm-specific construct” (Eccles & Krzus, 2014, 
p. 121). Thus, an issue is deemed to be material for the company and its stakeholders if the 
board believes the issue to be material. However, Eccles and Krzus (2014) further argue that 
boards should engage with stakeholders as these stakeholders hold influence over the reporter 
and because there is a moral obligation on companies to provide information to society.  
However, there is considerable variation in the way organisations undertake their materiality 
assessment (Farooq & De Villiers, 2019b; Jones et al., 2016). This is because sustainability 
reporting is still voluntary in most jurisdictions and reporters can choose whether to follow the 
requirements of international sustainability reporting standards. As a result, reporters can 
decide which stakeholders to engage with, how to engage with these stakeholders, the 
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importance assigned to different stakeholders and ultimately which issues are perceived to be 
material (Adams & Frost, 2006; Kaur & Lodhia, 2018; Owen et al., 2001; Unerman, 2007; 
Unerman, 2008). 
Importantly, reporters are encouraged to provide information on how they undertook their 
materiality assessment within their sustainability report. For example, the GRI states, “… the 
reporting organization shall include an explanation of how the Materiality principle was 
applied to identify material topics, including any assumptions made” (GRI, 2016, p. 34). 
Similarly, (KPMG, 2014, p. 8) states, “[c]ompanies should make clear the process they have 
used to assess materiality, how they have involved stakeholders in this process, and how they 
have used the materiality assessment to inform,” Disclosure on the prioritisation of the material 
issues identified often takes the form of what is referred to as a materiality matrix (Jones et al., 
2016). This matrix is often a two-dimensional graph that is used to rank material issues based 
on, for example, the importance of the issue to the reporter (high vs low) and importance of the 
issue to the stakeholder (high vs low). Given that a materiality assessment is an inherently 
subjective exercise and given that ultimately the board decides what issues are material, 
disclosing information on the materiality assessment can allow users to assess whether the 
process adopted conforms to best practice and why certain issues were not reported on 
(Bellantuono et al., 2016; Beske et al., 2020).   
Despite the increasing emphasis placed by standard setters on materiality, research shows that 
reporters do not perform well in this area (KPMG, 2013). For example, in a 2013 KPMG 
survey, the world’s largest 250 companies scored only 66 out of 100 for their disclosure on 
materiality. Similar results were noted by Jones et al. (2016) who examined the disclosure 
practices of the top 10 UK retailers to evaluate how and to what extent these companies were 
providing information on their materiality assessment process. They found that disclosure of 
materiality assessment within sustainability reports was limited and the description of the 
materiality assessment provided revealed that these reporters were adopting a variety of 
different approaches to undertaking a materiality assessment. On stakeholder engagement, De 
Villiers et al. (2014) analysed 23 sustainability reports published by Australian local councils 
in 2009 and 2010 to assess the level and extent of disclosure over stakeholder engagement by 
the reporter. Very little information was provided on stakeholder engagement. Importantly, 
while reporters disclosed the issues or challenges, they faced in identifying and selecting 
stakeholders, “… not one local council provided any information about the method of 
stakeholder identification and selection” (p. 67). 
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3. Theoretical framework 
Accounting can be described as an exercise aimed at promoting transparency and 
organisational accountability (Bebbington, 2001).  Sustainability accounting practices, such as 
sustainability reporting, are designed to provide information on organisations sustainability 
performance to a broader range of stakeholders (Deegan, 2013; Gray, 2006; Hopwood et al., 
2010; Ong et al., 2016; Unerman & Chapman, 2014) and in doing so would “assist in liberating 
and empowering the wider society” (O’Dwyer, 2003, p. 524). However, critics argue that 
instead of promoting transparency and organisational accountability leading to change, 
sustainability reporting (and sustainability accounting technologies in general) is subject to 
managerial capture (Owen et al., 1997; Owen et al., 2000) and is used to preserve the status 
quo (O’Dwyer, 2003). A similar theoretical lens is used by Michelon et al., (2015) who 
examine the quality of sustainability reports published by listed UK companies.   
Managerial capture, in the context of sustainability accounting, is described as a phenomenon 
whereby organisational managers control the discourse over what sustainability is and direct 
the conversation in a manner that promotes their interest while frustrating efforts to achieve 
radical change (Farooq & De Villiers, 2019b; O’Dwyer, 2003). Managers control the reporting 
process with the aim of using their sustainability reports to present a positive image of the 
organisation, thereby maintaining the status quo and avoiding any real transparency and 
corporate accountability. Researchers who examine the quality of sustainability reports find 
that most sustainability reports resemble public relations or marketing documents which 
present the reporting entities’ achievements (the good news/positive performance) while 
providing little to no information on material issues - thereby conveniently excluding any 
discussion over material bad news (the negative performance/impacts) (Unerman & Chapman, 
2014). Researchers conclude that these poor-quality sustainability reports fail to promote 
transparency and accountability (Bebbington & Gray, 2001; Gray, 1996, 2006, 2010). Instead, 
managers use sustainability reports as a corporate veil, concealing the true impact of their 
business operations (Hopwood, 2009). In this way, sustainability reports mislead 
organisational stakeholders (Deegan & Rankin, 1996) and are harmful to societal goals of 
promoting sustainable development (Deegan, 2002). 
The recommendations of standard setters (such as the GRI) for materiality assessment 
disclosure potentially offers a way to address the issue of managerial capture and promote high-
quality sustainability reporting. It does so by allowing stakeholders to evaluate for themselves 
the process used by the reporter in identifying material issues and compare it with the 
requirements of international sustainability reporting standards. This opens the company’s 
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sustainability reporting processes to outside scrutiny and provides stakeholders with an 
opportunity to critique the materiality assessment to ensure it conforms to international best 
practice. While not a panacea for managerial capture, this does have the potential to reduce the 
issue and lead to higher quality sustainability reporting. 
3.1 Determinants of materiality assessment disclosures 
Despite growing emphasis from global standard setters for companies to adopt materiality in 
their sustainability reports to improve sustainability reporting quality, the level of transparency 
in sustainability reporting reports among GCC countries remains low (KPMG, 2017). This low 
level of transparency in a contextual setting where sustainability reporting is voluntary, 
highlights the need to identify the corporate characteristics that lead some companies to 
disclose information on their materiality assessment. In this regard, Gerwanski et al. (2019) 
examine the determinants of materiality assessment disclosure quality in integrated reporting 
in a sample of European and South African companies. They find that corporate governance 
quality (gender diversity and assurance) and the learning affect positively influence materiality 
assessment score/quality. However, integrated report readability, listing status and earnings 
management do not have influence materiality assessment disclosures. In a review of 178 
articles on sustainability reporting, Hahn and Kühnen (2013) found that the most frequently 
investigated determinants of the extent and quality of sustainability reporting are: corporate 
financial performance, corporate leverage, corporate governance quality and corporate size. 
Therefore, we use these characteristics to draw the study’s hypotheses.  
3.1.1 Corporate financial performance and materiality disclosure  
Prior literature linking corporate financial performance with sustainability reporting quality has 
largely failed to find any conclusive results (Hahn & Kühnen, 2013). For instance, some 
researchers argue that poor financial performance (e.g. low profitability) makes it difficult for 
companies to engage in costly and potentially risky and extensive high quality/transparent 
sustainability reporting (Cormier & Magnan, 2003; Stanny & Ely, 2008). Others, however, 
point out that sustainability reporting, subject to managerial capture, assists companies in 
securing legitimacy amongst both stakeholders and providers of capital (creditors) (Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2005). Thus, empirical research on financial performance as a determinant of the extent 
and quality of sustainability reporting provides mixed results (Hahn & Kühnen, 2013). 
However, Khan et al. (2016) find that a significant number of these studies fail to consider 
materiality in their analysis. Building on these insights, we argue that managers working in 
companies with better financial performance, reflecting better management practices, 
potentially have less need for undertaking managerial capture. Hence, managers of high 
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performing companies will enhance their non-financial information flows by incorporating 
materiality assessment disclosures into their sustainability reports. In line with Hahn and 
Kühnen (2013), we selected two measures of corporate financial performance: profitability 
(Return on Assets), and market performance (market-to-book ratio). We expect a significant 
positive association of corporate profitability and market performance with materiality 
assessment disclosure scores. Taken altogether we aim to test the following hypothesis: 
H1: Corporate financial performance influences the extent of materiality assessment 
disclosure amongst GCC listed companies. 
3.1.2 Corporate leverage and materiality assessment disclosure 
Researchers have examined the relationship between corporate leverage and the extent of 
voluntary sustainability reporting. The findings in this literature show mixed results with some 
researchers documenting a positive relationship (Barako et al., 2006; De Beelde & Tuybens, 
2015), while others finding a negative relationship (Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; Cormier & 
Magnan, 2003) or no relationship (Clarkson et al., 2011; Kent & Monem, 2008; Stanny & Ely, 
2008) between these two variables. Researchers offer differing explanations for these results. 
Researchers that note a positive relationship explain that companies with higher leverage will 
undertake greater disclosures to reduce information asymmetry and lower the cost of capital 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Further, companies with higher gearing levels are more likely to 
provide higher levels of sustainability disclosures in an attempt to negotiate better credit terms. 
Also, high leverage companies need to demonstrate compliance with debt covenants and will 
do so by providing more information (Lim et al., 2020). Finally, Haniffa and Cooke (2005), 
using a legitimacy lens, argue that by providing sustainability information, companies can 
secure legitimacy from creditors and shareholders. Studies which find a negative relationship 
or no relationship argue that higher leverage companies are financially burdened and therefore 
cannot afford the cost of sustainability reporting or the reputational and legal costs associated 
with disclosing potentially damaging information (Cormier & Magnan, 2003; Stanny & Ely, 
2008).  
However, there is a dearth of studies examining the relationship between leverage and 
sustainability reporting quality (Hahn & Kühnen, 2013). For example, Clarkson et al. (2008), 
using a sample of 191 US companies found a significant positive association between leverage 
and environmental disclosure quality. However, (Brammer & Pavelin, 2006) using a sample of 
447 UK companies found that a higher level of leverage decreases the quality of environmental 
disclosures. Thus, this study proposes the following hypothesis: 
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H2: Corporate leverage influences the extent of materiality assessment disclosure amongst 
GCC listed companies. 
3.1.3 Corporate governance and materiality disclosure 
The impact of good corporate governance on the quality of financial reporting has been well 
documented in the literature. In this manner, researchers have identified a number of factors 
that are associated with disclosure quality including: the board of directors (Bananuka, Night, 
et al., 2019; Bananuka, Tumwebaze, et al., 2019; Nalukenge, 2020), audit committee 
(Bananuka, Kadaali, et al., 2019; Bananuka et al., 2018), and corporate governance quality 
(Nalukenge et al., 2018). Extending this work, academics have also explored the impact of 
good governance on sustainability reporting quality (Zaman, Nadeem, et al., 2020). 
Researchers have found that corporate governance is a significant determinant of the extent of 
sustainability reporting (Jain & Jamali, 2016) and has the power and capacity to influence 
organisational decisions relating to materiality assessment disclosures. Despite its significance 
and importance, the influence of corporate governance structures on the quality and extent of 
sustainability reporting has received relatively little academic attention (Hahn & Kühnen, 
2013). The limited work in this area indicates that the presence of independent directors on 
corporate boards has an influence the quality and extent of sustainability reporting. Independent 
or non-executive directors are appointed to represent a broader group of stakeholders and 
therefore put pressure on boards to adopt corporate sustainability (Ibrahim & Angelidis, 1995). 
However, the impact of independent directors on the extent and quality of sustainability 
reporting provides mixed results. For example, while Prado‐Lorenzo et al. (2009) find that 
independent directors influence the nature and extent of sustainability reporting, others argue 
that non-executive directors do not have a significant influence on sustainability reporting 
(Fuente et al., 2017; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005).  
In the context of materiality assessment disclosures, we expect that companies with better 
corporate governance will engage in better sustainability reporting, that is, provide more 
extensive disclosures on their materiality assessment. Such companies are characterised by 
effective monitoring of management by the board and are likely to exhibit lower instances of 
managerial capture. For instance, prior literature indicates that high board monitoring leads to 
lower managerial entrenchment and high corporate transparency (Jain and Zaman, 2020; 
Zaman et al., 2018). Conversely, managers in companies characterised by poor corporate 
governance are more likely to engage in managerial capture and thus withhold or limit their 
materiality assessment disclosures, thereby maintaining the status quo and avoiding any real 
transparency and corporate accountability. We followed the prior literature and measured 
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corporate governance via two measures: (i) corporate governance quality score and (ii) board 
independence (Hahn & Kühnen, 2013). We expect that low corporate governance quality and 
a low number of independent directors may increase managerial capture and reduce the extent 
of materiality assessment disclosures.  
H3: Corporate governance is associated with the extent of materiality assessment disclosures 
amongst GCC listed companies.  
3.1.4 Company size and materiality disclosure 
In terms of corporate size, researchers have found that larger companies (size measured using 
a range of financial indicators including total assets and revenue) are more visible and their 
practices attract greater stakeholder attention (Fortanier et al., 2011; Gallo & Christensen, 
2011). Thus, larger companies are more likely to increase the extent and quality of their 
sustainability reporting than smaller ones. It can also be argued that larger companies have the 
financial resources necessary to undertake expensive sustainability reporting. Larger 
companies can also absorb potential costs associated with information transparency (i.e. 
reputational and legal costs and risks) (Cormier & Magnan, 2003; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; 
Kent & Monem, 2008). However, Hahn and Kühnen (2013) note that empirical results in this 
area are mixed.  
However, the size of a reporter poses a unique challenge when drawing causal inferences with 
materiality assessment disclosures. Prior studies have found that company size does not 
influence the extent of sustainability reporting quality (Ettredge et al., 2011; Vormedal & Ruud, 
2009). However, large companies do attract greater media and regulatory scrutiny and therefore 
it is plausible to assume that managers in large companies, attempting to protect corporate 
reputation and to avoid regulatory costs, potentially engage in greater managerial capture and 
thereby avoid disclosing information on their materiality assessment (Zaman et al., 2018). 
However, it can also be argued that large companies are accountable to a diverse group of 
stakeholders to whom they need to justify their reporting decisions, such as, why certain issues 
were deemed material while others were not. By providing information on their materiality 
assessment, companies can address stakeholder suspicions around a lack of transparency 
(Global Reporting Initiative, 2013; KPMG, 2015, 2017). Based on these arguments, we predict 
that company size is an important determinant for the extent of materiality assessment 
disclosures.  




4. Research method 
This section presents the research method used to address the research questions and discusses 
the method used to collect and analyse the data. 
4.1 The Gulf Cooperation Council 
The study examines the sustainability reports published by listed GCC companies. The GCC 
comprises “Arab Muslim majority” countries (Gerged et al., 2018, p. 573). The combined 
population of the region was approximately 54 million in 2016 (GCC-STAT, n.d.). The GCC 
states are one of the largest oil and gas exporters in the world (Statista, n.d.). Income from these 
exports drives the GCC economies, which are ranked amongst the world’s richest nations 
(World Factbook, n.d.). This wealth translates into a high demand for carbon-intensive goods 
and services. The largest economy in the GCC is that of KSA with a GDP of 654 billion USD 
in 2015 (The World Bank, n.d.). This is followed by the UAE (USD 358 billion), Qatar (USD 
162 billion), Kuwait (USD 115 billion), Oman (USD 69 billion) and Bahrain (USD 31 billion). 
In terms of GDP per capita, Qatar leads the GCC with a GDP per capita in 2017 of USD 
124,500, followed by the UAE (USD 67,700), Kuwait (USD 66,200), KSA (USD 54,800), 
Bahrain (USD 48,500) and Oman (USD 45,200) (The World Bank, n.d.).  
Research shows that a culture of corporate secrecy is attributed to the Middle East (Leigh, 
2011). The lack of corporate transparency is attributed to macro/societal and 
micro/organisational level characteristics. At a macro-level institutional, “the long period of 
Ottoman dominance of the region that led to the establishment of a secretive and arbitrary 
bureaucracy unchecked by any democratically representative institutions may have contributed 
to this lack of transparency (Leigh, 2011, p. 154). [Further], state-run companies and family-
owned businesses (including large conglomerates) are lacking in transparency (Leigh, 2011). 
In addition, financial markets and corporate governance arrangements remain underdeveloped 
(Jamali, Jain, Samara, Zoghbi, 2020).   
The governments of the GCC have expressed their commitment to achieving the UN SDGs. 
For example, the KSA’s Voluntary National Review to the 2018 United Nations High-Level 
Political Forum on Sustainable Development is the Kingdom’s first attempt to conduct a 
comprehensive review of the status of the SDGs, their alignment with ‘Vision for 2030’, and 
the actions taken by national entities including the government sector, the private sector, and 
non-government organizations to fulfil the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Despite 




4.2 Sample selection and data collection 
To address the research objectives, we focused on listed companies because these are more 
likely to engage in sustainability reporting and publish their sustainability reports, which could 
be accessed from their websites. Our sample includes companies from all industries7. To 
identify listed GCC companies we visited the websites of stock exchanges based in the six 
GCC states. Of these six GCC states, the UAE consists of seven states of which two have stock 
exchanges of their own – Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Thus, a total of seven stock exchanges were 
identified, including: Tadawul (KSA), Muscat Securities Market (Oman), Bahrain Bourse 
(Bahrain), Qatar Stock Exchange (Qatar), Boursa Kuwait (Kuwait), Dubai Financial Market 
(Dubai) and Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (Abu Dhabi). From the websites of these seven 
stock exchanges, we developed a list of 704 companies. These 704 companies’ sustainability 
reporting practices were analysed over a five-year period, yielding a total of 3,520 firm-year 
observations. 
Subsequently, the websites of each company were visited to identify sustainability reports 
published during the five years from 2013 to 2017. Our sample starts in 2013 due to the 
availability of annual reports for GCC listed companies. These reports are identified by 
different names such as: sustainability report, corporate responsibility or corporate social 
responsibility report and social and environmental report. If a sustainability report was not 
published, then the company’s annual report was analysed to identify potential sustainability 
disclosures made therein (De Villiers & Marques, 2016). This was done by reading the table 
of contents and by conducting a word search (keywords included sustainability, corporate 
social responsibility, social responsibility or environmental responsibility, Environment, Social 
and Governance (ESG), corporate philanthropy, charity, and corporate donation). Of note, for 
robustness, all of the reports in PDF format (except for a few which were in JPEG format) were 
imported to NVivo software for a word query based on a pre-defined search string and found 
qualitatively similar results.     
As a result of this exercise, we found that 52% of listed GCC companies issued either a set of 
audited financial statements or a brief annual report (i.e. containing the board and CEO’s 
statements, minutes of the annual general meeting and audited financial statements) and 16% 
provided no report. Thus, only 32% of the listed companies published a sustainability report. 
These consisted of stand-alone sustainability reports (4%) and sustainability information 
contained within a single annual report (28%). Hence, a total of 1,147 sustainability reports 
 
7 Our industry classification is based on Standard Industry Classification (SIC) available at  https://siccode.com/ 
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(out of 3,520 reports) published during the five years from 2013 to 2017 were identified (Table 
1).  
Insert Table 1 about here 
We acknowledge two limitations to our data collection. First, sustainability reports published 
by companies delisted before 2017 were not included in the analysis. Second, we assumed that 
all companies identified in 2017 had been listed since 2013 and therefore should have been 
publishing a sustainability report in each of the five years from 2013 to 2017. Despite these 
limitations, we believe that this study does achieve its objectives of providing an overview of 
the comprehensiveness of materiality assessment disclosures provided by these companies 
during the period of analysis.  
4.3 Data analysis 
The identified sustainability reports were analysed using the technique of content analysis 
(Krippendorff, 2004). This technique has been extensively used in literature to analyse 
published sustainability reports (Belal, 2002; Bradley & Botchway, 2018; Haque & Deegan, 
2010; Islam & Deegan, 2008). Guthrie et al. (2004, p. 287)  define content analysis “[a]s a 
technique for gathering data, it involves codifying qualitative and quantitative information into 
pre‐defined categories to derive patterns in the presentation and reporting of information. The 
content analysis seeks to analyse published information systematically, objectively and 
reliably.” This makes content analysis a particularly effective tool for analysing large sets of 
data, thereby facilitating both a comparative and longitudinal analysis.  
Content analysis can be used to count the frequency of occurrence of certain disclosure items 
(Kamal & Deegan, 2013) or to assess the extent of occurrence of certain disclosure items by 
counting words or sentences (Hackston & Milne, 1996) or to evaluate disclosure by scoring 
disclosure items against a scoring index (De Villiers & Van Staden, 2006). This study uses 
content analysis to evaluate disclosure by scoring materiality assessment disclosures from zero 
(no information provided) to five (comprehensive disclosure).  
Score 0: A score of zero is allocated to those reporters who do not refer to a materiality 
assessment. In such cases, sustainability report users: (1) are not made aware of the concept of 
materiality assessment (the underlying process which determines the content of sustainability 
reports); (2) do not know if a materiality assessment was undertaken; and (3) if a materiality 
assessment was undertaken, do not know whether the process adopted meets the requirements 
of internationally recognised standards and agreed-upon best practice in sustainability 
reporting (see Appendix A1 for example).  
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Score 1: A score of one is allocated to those reporters who claim to have undertaken a 
materiality assessment but do not provide any information on the steps undertaken in their 
assessment. These reporters score a point because they at least create an awareness of the 
concept of a materiality assessment (a process underlying the sustainability report) amongst 
report users and potentially open themselves up to demands for more comprehensive reporting 
in the future. However, the remaining two limitations discussed for zero score reporters remain 
unaddressed (see Appendix A1 for example). 
Score 2: A score of two is allocated to those reporters who provide limited information on how 
the materiality assessment was undertaken. The term ‘limited’ refers to reports that offer a brief 
commentary on some (or all) of the steps undertaken by the reporter in identifying material 
issues. However, no materiality matrix is provided to sustainability report users. A consequence 
of providing limited disclosure is that sustainability report users lack a clear and comprehensive 
understanding of how the reporter undertook the materiality assessment to prepare its 
sustainability report in that given year, and whether the process adopted meets internationally 
recognised standards. The lack of a materiality matrix means that users are unable to understand 
how (i.e. the basis or criteria used) issues, once identified, were prioritized into the material 
and non-material (i.e. excluded from the sustainability report) issues.  
In scoring disclosures, we do not use any single benchmark (e.g. the GRI). We recognise that 
while the GRI outlines a four-step approach, other experts such as KPMG present a seven-step 
model (see Section 2.2). These differences represent variations in practice, which are to be 
expected given that materiality - and how it should be reviewed; i.e. a materiality assessment - 
is a relatively new and evolving concept in the field of sustainability reporting. Instead, we 
focus on evaluating the comprehensiveness of materiality assessment disclosures provided by 
the reporters and assessing to what extent these disclosures satisfy the information needs of 
sustainability report users (see Appendix A1 for example). 
Score 3: A score of three is allocated to those reporters who provide limited information on 
their materiality assessment. However, in comparison to the previous group of reporters, these 
companies include a materiality matrix in their disclosure. The matrix provides a visual 
summary of the prioritisation of issues (and the criteria used) by the reporter (Global Reporting 
Initiative, 2015). Thus, while sustainability report users lack a detailed and comprehensive 
understanding of the materiality assessment, they can assess how identified issues were 
prioritised into material and non-material disclosures (see Appendix A1 for example).  
Score 4: A score of four is allocated to those reporters who provide a comprehensive disclosure 
on their materiality assessment but fail to provide a materiality matrix. The term 
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“comprehensive disclosure” refers to providing a clear and complete presentation of the 
materiality assessment. The disclosure provided should allow users to understand the various 
steps adopted by the reporter and to evaluate whether these steps are suitable and meet the 
requirements of internationally recognised standards and agreed-upon best practice in 
sustainability reporting (see Appendix A1 for example). 
Score 5: A score of five is allocated to those reporters who provide comprehensive disclosure 
on their materiality assessment as well as providing users with a materiality matrix8. Table 2 
provides a summary of the scores (see Appendix A1 for example). 
Insert Table 2 about here 
We recognize the subjectivity inherent in differentiating between limited and comprehensive 
disclosures. We addressed this by providing examples of disclosures with scores from one to 
five as presented in Appendix A. This allows the reader to gain a better understanding of how 
limited disclosure compares against comprehensive disclosure. Also, our approach is based on 
the recommendations of Beske et al. (2020) who argue in favour of using ranking indexing to 
analyse materiality assessment disclosure quality. Further, we argue that reporters have a range 
of standards and frameworks to assist them in undertaking a materiality assessment and that 
our index is broadly based on the recommendations of the GRI which is the most popular 
sustainability reporting standards used across the world (KPMG, 2017).    
The identified sustainability reports were analysed to evaluate the comprehensiveness of 
materiality assessment disclosures. To do this, we first identified materiality assessment 
disclosures provided in the sustainability reports. This was done by searching for keywords 
appearing in the PDF file (e.g. material, materiality, materiality assessment, materiality 
exercise, materiality process, materiality approach, materiality analysis, materiality 
determination, stakeholder engagement, materiality matrix, and so on.) and manual reading of 
JPEG format sustainability reports. If none of these words appeared in the search, the 
sustainability report was reviewed to identify potential sections that would provide disclosure 
on the reporter’s materiality assessment. The identified disclosures were then scored, and the 
Excel worksheet was updated. If no reference was made to materiality assessment, then the 
reporter was allocated a score of zero. A score of one to five was allocated based on the judged 
disclosure over materiality. 
 
8 There is a risk that some reporters may claim to have undertaken a comprehensive assessment but, may have 
only undertaken a loose informal assessment. However, with increasing trends in sustainability assurance (Farooq 
and De Villiers, 2018, 2019b; KPMG, 2017), this risk is mitigated (to an extent) if an external sustainability 




To maintain the reliability of the coding process, one of the authors recorded the results of two 
randomly chosen reports on a separate Excel sheet. Thereafter, the lead author of the study 
independently repeated the same process. We then applied the K-alpha test to check the coding 
reliability (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007; Krippendorff, 2018). The K-alpha score was 0.87 
which is well above the recommended score of 0.80 (Krippendorff, 2018). Further discussion 
between the authors clarified the disagreement and the agreed coding/score were carried out 
on the remaining reports. This ensured that there was a consensus amongst the research team 
on the scores allocated (De Villiers & Alexander, 2014). Of note, the coding/scoring of 
sustainability reports containing materiality assessment disclosures was undertaken by one 
researcher and the work was checked by the other two researchers. The detailed examples of 
disclosure scores are provided in Appendix A of this study.  
4.3.1 Determinants of materiality disclosure 
To estimate the company-level characteristics on materiality disclosure, we estimated Equation 
1 using fixed-effect ordered logit regression. Fixed effects ordered logit model allows 
researchers with panel data and an ordinal dependent variable (i.e. materiality assessment 
disclosure is 0 to 5) to control time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity (Baetschmann et al., 
2015). We also used the Poisson regression as an alternative estimation because of the nature 
of our dependent variables (with count 0 to 5). 






+ 𝑖,𝑡 (Equation 1) 
 
Where i represents the company and t represents time (year); 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑖,𝑡 represents 
the materiality assessment disclosure score for “𝑖” company at year “𝑡” year (which is manually 
developed in this study); 𝑋𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 represents the four sets of independent variables for a company 
i at year t; (i) Corporate Financial Performance measured Return on Asset (ROA) and market-
to-book value (MTB), (ii) Corporate Leverage measured as total debt to total equity, (iii) 
Corporate Governance Quality captured as the number of independent board directors and 
Thomson Reuters Eikon CG quality score and (iv) Company Size captured as the natural 
logarithm of total asset.  𝐶𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 represents the macroeconomic level control variables to limit the 
countries' effect. These variables are taken from World Bank Governance Indicators Database 
and include Voice and Accountability Index, Regulatory Quality, GDP and GDP growth (see 
Appendix A2 for variables details). 
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5. Findings and analysis 
This section presents the findings from the study. The analysis is organised into three parts. 
The first provides an overview of sustainability reporting rates among listed GCC companies. 
The second evaluates the comprehensiveness of materiality assessment disclosures. The third 
provides examples of materiality assessment disclosures scored from one to five. 
5.1 Overview of sustainability reporting rates 
At a regional level, the analysis reveals an increasing trend in sustainability reporting over the 
five years. The study found that 40% of listed GCC companies engaged in sustainability 
reporting in 2017 (compared to 25% in 2013). This trend reflects regional regulatory efforts to 
promote sustainability. For instance, the launch of the Middle East Sustainable Investment 
Forum (MESIF)9 by the Qatar Stock Exchange in 2017, the introduction of ‘The Pearl Rating 
System’ for Estidama10 by the Abu Dubai government with the aim of addressing sustainability 
challenges in construction projects, and KSA’s commitment to implementing UN sustainable 
development goals11 have encouraged companies operating in the region to demonstrate their 
efforts towards promoting sustainability through the publication of sustainability reports.  
The results reported in Table 3 indicate the highest sustainability reporting rates were observed 
in Bahrain and Qatar, where 52% of listed companies published a sustainability report in 2017 
(up from 39% and 41% in 2013 respectively). This was followed by KSA, where disclosure 
rates were 43% in 2017 (up from 31% in 2013). The success of Bahrain and Qatar is led by 
government initiatives for sustainability development. For instance, the Bahrain government is 
engaged in efforts to wean the economy away from oil exports – making it a regional pioneer 
in economic diversification. Due to these diversification initiatives, the oil and gas sector in 
Bahrain accounted for 19% of GDP in 2017 compared with 43.6% in 200012. Similarly, the 
Qatar Stock Exchange is working to promote responsible investment (e.g. Middle East 
Sustainable Investment Forum), prompting listed companies to report sustainability 
information. The lowest sustainability reporting rates were observed in Oman, Kuwait, Dubai 
and Abu Dhabi, where only 34%, 36%, 36% and 37% of listed companies published a 
sustainability report in 2017 (up from 22%, 16%, 20% and 26% respectively in 2013) (See 
Table 3).  The lower rates of disclosures are not surprising as sustainability reporting remains 










significant majority of listed entities in the GCC fail to provide their stakeholders with 
information on their sustainability performance. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
The highest sustainability reporting rates were observed for companies operating in the 
transportation and public utilities sector (see Table 4), which accounted for 66% of the 
sustainability reports published in 2017 (up from 59% in 2013). This was followed by the 
finance, insurance and real estate sector, where disclosure rates rose from 28% in 2013 to 42% 
in 2017. Services and manufacturing companies accounted for 38% and 36% of sustainability 
reports published in 2017, while the lowest disclosure rates in 2017 were observed to be in the 
retail trade, mining and construction sectors with 17%, 26% and 29% of companies publishing 
a sustainability report, respectively.  
Insert table 4 about here 
5.2 GRI adoption rates  
At a regional level, the analysis indicates a decline in GRI adoption rates from 12% of 
sustainability reporters referring to the GRI in 2013 to just 8% in 2017. At a country level, the 
highest adoption rates were found among listed companies in Qatar, with 16.7% of 
sustainability reporters making some reference to the GRI in 2017 (Panel A of Table 5). The 
lowest adoption rates were amongst listed companies in Kuwait at 3.1%. GRI adoption rates 
increased in Bahrain, Qatar and KSA while Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Kuwait and Oman experienced 
a decline during the five years of analysis.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
5.3 Materiality assessment disclosure rates and scores 
At a regional level, the analysis indicates a decline in the number of sustainability reports 
containing information on materiality assessment (from 10.2% in 2013 to 8.6% in 2017) among 
the listed GCC companies). At a country level, the analysis shows that the highest disclosure 
rates were among listed companies in Qatar (12.5% in 2017) while the lowest disclosure rates 
were observed among listed companies based in Kuwait (3.1% in 2017) (Panel B of Table 5). 
In terms of materiality assessment scores, the analysis shows that at a regional level a slight 
improvement in the comprehensiveness of materiality assessment disclosures was noted, with 
materiality assessment scores increasing from 2.39 in 2013 to 3.08 in 2017.  At a country level, 
listed companies based in Abu Dhabi and Oman both scored 4.33 in 2017, moving up from 
2.33 and 2.5 respectively in 2013 (Panel C of Table 5). Sustainability reporters based in Qatar, 
Bahrain and Kuwait scored 3.67, 3 and 3 respectively in 2017 (up from 2, 2 and 2.5 respectively 
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in 2013). In comparison, the lowest scores were awarded to listed companies based in Dubai 
and KSA, where the average materiality assessment scores in 2017 were 2.67 (2.33 in 2015) 
and 2.5 (2.35 in 2013).  
5.4 Determinants of materiality assessment disclosure 
Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables included in our study. Our dependent 
variable’s mean value (1.486) is on the lower side, indicating poor quality of materiality 
assessment disclosure across our sample companies. The companies in our sample have a 
decent size with a mean value of 22.5. In terms of performance variables, the results show 
above average (62.7%) debt in the capital structure with an average profit (Return on Assets) 
of 12.9%. With an average MTB of 1.660, 23.4% of our sample companies lack independent 
board structures. This trend can be attributed to the prevalence of kinship type culture in the 
Middle East. However, overall, we found on average CG quality disclosure across our sample 
period is 62 %. The macro-control variables indicate a lack of voice freedom (15.4%) with 
above-average regulatory quality (68%) and lower economic growth (2.9%).  
Insert Table 6 about here 
Table 7 results report the pairwise correlation coefficient for explanatory variables and control 
variables. The results of the Pearson coefficient are well below the threshold, at 0.80, indicating 
no issue of multicollinearity13 among explanatory and control variables. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
Table 8 reports the regression results for Equation 1. The fixed effect ordered logic regression 
results without and with control variables are presented in Model (1) and (2) respectively. 
Model (3) uses the regression results of Equation 1 based on an alternative estimation 
technique, the Poisson regression. From the corporate financial performance variables in Model 
(2), we found that companies generating high profitability (ROA: β = 0.121, p < 0.01) are 
significantly positively associated with materiality assessment disclosure score. We fail to find 
any association between market-to-book ratio (MTB: β = 0.0979, p > 0.10) and materiality 
assessment disclosure scores, indicating corporate market performance does not correlate with 
materiality assessment disclosures14. Overall, these results provide partial support to H1 - that 
 
13 Multicollinearity refers when two or more explanatory variables in multiple regression are highly correlated 
with each other. In such cases i.e. presence of multicollinearity, the result showing the effect of explanatory 
variables on dependent variables will be biased. 
14 We have also used an alternative measure of corporate market performance, i.e. Tobin-Q. Following Jain and 
Zaman, (2020), we measured Tobin-Q as Market value of equity + book value of equity – deferred tax / book 
value of assets. The statistically insignificant result of Tobin-Q confirms our earlier conjecture that market 
performance does not matters in terms of Materiality Assessment Disclosure Score (results available upon 
request).   
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better corporate financial performance (i.e. Return on Assets) influences the extent of 
materiality assessment disclosure amongst GCC listed companies. This may indicate a 
reduction in instances of managerial capture which then increases the extent of materiality 
assessment disclosures. In terms of H2, we find that corporate leverage is significantly 
negatively (Leverage: β = -0.755, p < 0.01) associated with materiality assessment disclosure 
scores. These results suggest the possibility of the presence of managerial capture and suggest 
that managers in companies with higher gearing publish low-quality sustainability reports that 
avoid materiality assessment disclosure. From the corporate governance perspective, our 
results show that more independent directors on corporate boards are significantly and 
positively (Board independence: β = 0.0434, p < 0.01) related to materiality assessment 
disclosure scores. These results suggest that independent directors are effective in monitoring 
management and may also keep a check on managerial capture – which potentially increases 
the extent of materiality assessment disclosures. We also find that the overall corporate 
governance quality is significantly and positively (Governance Quality: β = 0.0586, p < 0.01) 
associated with materiality assessment disclosure scores. Taken together, these results provide 
strong support to H3 and indicate that companies with better corporate governance are more 
transparent potentially indicating lower levels of managerial capture. For H4, we fail to find 
any support. Our result shows that company size does not (Company size: β = 0.0144, p > 0.10) 
influence the extent of materiality assessment disclosures. In contrast to our hypothesized 
contentions, this finding is consistent with prior studies that found no relationship between 
company size and the extent and quality of sustainability reporting (Ettredge et al., 2011; 
Vormedal & Ruud, 2009). 
Insert Table 8 about here 
From the perspective of our control variables, the results show that companies in countries with 
a high voice and accountability score are significantly positively associated (Voice and 
Accountability Index: β = 0.0127, p < 0.05) with the extent of materiality assessment 
disclosures. This finding implies countries with secretive societies are characterised by 
relatively weaker corporate governance mechanisms which result in a lack of transparency and 
poor materiality assessment disclosures. We also found that companies based in high GDP 
economies (ln.GDP) are significantly negatively associated (ln.GDP: β = -2.612, p < 0.01) with 
the extent of materiality assessment disclosures. This is likely to be because GCC economies 
are heavily dependent on the oil and gas companies for their GDP. This is in line with our 
earlier analysis for the industry levels that depicts a large portion of environmentally sensitive 
industries exhibits low sustainability reporting. We also find no association of regulatory 
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quality and GDP growth with materiality assessment disclosures which highlights the 
complexities of the GCC economies in relation to transparency and corporate accountability 
and needs further scholarly attention.  
We also test the robustness of these results by using an alternative estimation technique, the 
Poisson regression. The Poisson regression results presented in the Model (3) are qualitatively 
similar to our fixed effect ordered logit model.  
6. Discussion 
This study attempts to answer two research questions: (i) what is the extent of material 
assessment disclosures and (ii) what corporate characteristics (including corporate financial 
performance, corporate leverage, corporate governance and company size) influence 
materiality assessment disclosures scores? To answer these research questions, a content 
analysis of sustainability reports over the five years from 2013 and 2017 was carried out to 
evaluate the extent of materiality assessment disclosures. The determinants of materiality 
assessment disclosure were examined using regression analysis.  
Our findings reveal that sustainability reporting rates have improved in the GCC region, 
increasing from 25% in 2013 to 40% in 2017. The improvement in disclosure rates can be 
attributed to the efforts of the GCC states toward transitioning to a more sustainable growth 
path. These efforts are in line with the recommendations of international institutions such as 
the World Bank and United Nations which have encouraged the GCC states to prioritise 
sustainable development and reduce their dependency on hydrocarbon revenues at a time 
declining energy prices (Barbuscia & Khalid, 2019). However, we note that more effort is 
required as 60% (in 2017) of listed companies do not provide their stakeholders with 
information on their sustainability performance. These findings are in line with the KPMG 
survey (KPMG, 2017, p. 11) which found sustainability reporting rates are “traditionally low.” 
The failure of a majority of companies to publish a sustainability report is a potential indication 
of the presence of managerial capture which requires government attention.  
At a country level, listed companies in Qatar led the GCC with 52% of listed companies 
engaged in sustainability reporting while listed companies in Oman lagged, with only 34% 
providing their stakeholders with information on their sustainability performance. This is of 
concern as Oman’s economy “is particularly vulnerable to oil price swings” (Barbuscia & 
Khalid, 2019). In comparison, Qatar’s higher score can be attributed to the Qatari government’s 
initiatives and its active participation in the Kyoto Protocol (Raouf, 2008). 
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At an industry level, the highest sustainability reporting rates were found among listed 
companies operating in the transportation and public utilities industry (an average of 59% over 
the sample period) while the lowest disclosure rates were observed in mining companies (12%). 
Further, 21% of companies operating in environmentally sensitive industries such as 
manufacturing, construction and mining, provide stakeholders information on their 
sustainability performance over the five-year period of analysis. These figures are well below 
the global average reported in the KPMG 2017 survey which found that 76% of 
environmentally sensitive industries15 engaged in sustainability reporting. The low disclosure 
rates in the environmentally sensitive sectors are surprising given that a significant body of 
sustainability reporting literature is convinced that companies with a high environmental 
footprint are more likely to disclose information on their sustainability performance (Haufler, 
2010; Mirza & Zimmer, 2001). These findings potentially indicate that managers in these 
companies take advantage of voluntary reporting and avoid corporate accountability. In terms 
of GRI adoption rates amongst sustainability reporters, the study finds that these have declined 
from 11.9% in 2013 to 8.2% in 2017. In comparison, global GRI adoption is approximately 
89% in the world’s largest 250 companies and 74% amongst the top 100 companies from a 
sample of 49 countries (KPMG, 2017). These findings indicate that managers in listed GCC 
companies are not following the requirements of internationally recognised standards as doing 
so restricts managers’ ability to control the reporting agenda, giving rise to an increased 
likelihood of. managerial capture.   
In terms of materiality assessment disclosure rates, the study finds that the number of 
sustainability reports offering stakeholders information on how the reporter undertook the 
materiality assessment declined from 10.2% of published sustainability reports in 2013 to 8.6% 
in 2017. The decline can be attributed to a reduction in GRI adoption rates in the region. At a 
country level, in 2017 the materiality assessment disclosure rates were the highest in Qatar, 
which leads the GCC in terms of GRI adoption rates. In comparison, the lowest materiality 
assessment disclosure rates in 2017 were observed in Kuwait which also has experienced the 
most significant decline in GRI adoption rates in the GCC, from 10.7% in 2013 to 3.1% in 
2017. These results confirm the presence of managerial capture, as a decline in the adoption of 
internationally recognised standards leads to a decline in materiality assessment disclosures. 
In terms of materiality assessment disclosure scores, the study indicates that the average scores 
for the GCC region have improved, moving from 2.39 in 2013 to 3.08 in 2017. These results 
 
15 From the KPMG (2017) survey we group oil and gas, chemicals, mining, automotive, construction and 
materials, and industrials, manufacturing and metals into one cluster for ease of comparison. 
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are interesting because we see a decline in the number of sustainability reports that provide 
information on the reporters' materiality assessment whilst simultaneously finding that of the 
reporters that do provide their stakeholders with information on their materiality assessment, 
there is an improvement in the quality of such disclosures, witnessed by an increase in 
materiality assessment disclosures scores. These results motivate our second research question: 
what corporate characteristics influence materiality assessment disclosures scores? These 
corporate characteristics include corporate financial performance, corporate leverage, 
corporate governance and size and are based on the sustainability reporting quality literature 
(Hahn & Kühnen, 2013). 
In terms of financial performance, profitable (i.e. high Return on Assets) companies may have 
access to greater financial resources necessary to support the publication of high-quality 
sustainability reports. Further, profitable companies are usually characterised by better 
management practices and have less need for undertaking managerial capture (Baker, 2010). 
In terms of the market-to-book ratio, we do not find any association between market-to-book 
ratio and materiality assessment disclosure scores. Overall, these results suggest that corporate 
financial performance partially influences materiality assessment disclosure scores. These 
findings are in line with prior studies which suggest that heterogeneity in corporate financial 
performance leads to divergent organisational outcomes (Jain and Zaman, 2020).  
In terms of corporate leverage, the negative association between corporate leverage and 
materiality assessment disclosure scores suggests that companies with high leverage are 
financially burdened and cannot afford the cost of preparing high-quality sustainability reports 
or the reputational and legal costs associated with disclosing potentially damaging information. 
These results contrast to studies that argue that companies with higher gearing levels are likely 
to disclose higher quality results (Clarkson et al., 2008). We find that strong corporate 
governance (including the presence of independent directors on boards) are effective in 
monitoring managers and reducing the negative impact of managerial capture. 
Finally, we do not find any association between company size and materiality assessment 
disclosure scores. These findings are in line with the extant literature which finds no 
relationship between company size and sustainability reporting quality (Ettredge et al., 2011; 
Vormedal & Ruud, 2009). 
7.  Conclusion  
Sustainability reports are often criticised for not providing stakeholders with information on 
material issues (i.e. sustainability reporting suffers from managerial capture). One solution, 
advocated by standard setters (such as the GRI), practitioners (KPMG, 2013) and scholars (De 
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Villiers et al., 2014; Jones et al., 2016), is for reporters to provide their readers with information 
on how they undertake a how materiality assessment – how are issues and topics identified or 
for inclusion in their sustainability reports . This information would allow users to understand 
the reporter’s process and why some issues are reported on while others are excluded, using a 
materiality matrix. Additionally, users can evaluate the materiality assessment by comparing it 
against the requirements of internationally recognised standards, such as the GRI. This would 
promote greater confidence in sustainability reports among users.  
It is also important to understand what corporate characteristics influence materiality 
assessment disclosures amongst reporting entities. However, there remains a dearth of studies 
examining materiality in sustainability reporting (Beske et al., 2020; Unerman & Zappettini, 
2014). Further, despite the geopolitical significance of the GCC, the region has received little 
academic attention (Gerged et al., 2018). 
Sustainability reporting rates have improved across the sample period (25% in 2013 to 40% in 
2017), though 60% of listed GCC companies do not engage in sustainability reporting. The use 
of internationally recognised standards has also declined with only 8.2% of sustainability 
reports in 2017 referring to internationally recognised standards, compared to 11.9% 2013. 
While materiality assessment disclosures have improved (2.39 in 2013 to 3.08 in 2017), the 
number of sustainability reports that offer information on how the reporter identifies material 
issues has declined (10.2% in 2013 to 8.6% in 2017). Thus, materiality assessment disclosure 
practice varies, with some reporters offering users comprehensive information on their 
materiality assessment while others provide little (or in some instances no) information on how 
this was done. By failing to provide information on their materiality assessment, reporters are 
able to avoid stakeholder scrutiny over their underlying reporting processes and can maintain 
their control over the sustainability reporting agenda, and the potential for managerial capture 
persists. These findings extend Michelon et al., (2015) who note the symbolic use of 
sustainability reporting by companies and express scepticism that such practices are subject to 
managerial capture and fail to promote transparency and corporate accountability. Further, the 
study finds that materiality assessment disclosure scores are positively influenced by better 
corporate governance, lower corporate leverage and higher financial performance (i.e. higher 
Return on Assets). However, we find that company size and market-to-book ratio does not 
influence materiality assessment disclosure scores. 
7.1 Contributions 
At an academic level, the contributions from the study are twofold. First, the study addresses 
the call for greater research examining materiality in sustainability reporting and contributes to 
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the limited literature in this area (Beske et al., 2020; Unerman & Zappettini, 2014). Scholars 
have attributed the inconclusive findings of corporate sustainability disclosure and 
performance nexus to the lack of consideration of materiality disclosures (see, Khan et al., 
2016) and hence there is a need for greater research in this area to contribute to the literature. 
Our study fulfils this gap and brings novel insights from a managerial capture lens. 
Surprisingly, despite its relevance, this lens has not been widely used in the sustainability 
reporting literature (see, Hahn and Kuhnen, 2013). Improvements in the quality of materiality 
assessment disclosures have the potential to promote transparency and corporate 
accountability. Furthermore, the study offers useful insights into the sustainability reporting 
practices of companies based in high GDP economies generally and the GCC more specifically 
(Amran & Haniffa, 2011; Beske et al., 2020; Gerged et al., 2018). In this way, the study 
contributes to the limited existing literature examining a region that carries significant social, 
political and economic importance. Further, the GCC states have expressed a commitment to 
sustainable development and academic research can assist practitioners, reporters and 
regulators in improving the quality of their sustainability reporting. The study is novel in the 
sense that it captures the materiality assessment disclosure score of companies in a highly 
under-research region, the GCC, and also identifies and empirically tests corporate-level 
antecedents of materiality assessments. Further, academic attention to sustainability reporting 
rates in developing countries is useful as these countries are in the early stages of their 
sustainability reporting journey and variations in practice are more likely. 
At a practical level, the findings may prove useful to practitioners (including sustainability 
reporting managers and sustainability assurance providers) with regard to what constitutes best 
practice in sustainability reporting. Sustainability reporting managers are encouraged to 
provide comprehensive disclosure over their materiality assessments. The examples provided 
in this study will assist managers in this respect. Further, such disclosures should be included 
in the scope of sustainability assurance engagements (Farooq & De Villiers, 2019a) and 
sustainability assurance providers can use the examples of materiality assessment disclosures 
when evaluating corporate materiality assessment disclosures. Thus, regulators are encouraged 
to introduce tougher regulations around materiality assessment disclosures in sustainability 
reporting and sustainability assurance. Further, stock exchange regulators should introduce 
tougher corporate governance requirements around board structure (i.e. independent directors) 
and sustainability reporting standards (i.e. the use of internationally recognised sustainability 
reporting standards, e.g. GRI standards) as our results show that these variables lead to higher 
materiality assessment disclosure scores (results available upon request). Therefore, regulators 
should consider including these recommendations as part of corporate listing requirements.   
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Finally, the societal implications of these recommendations are improved sustainability 
reporting quality, specifically better materiality assessment disclosures, which can lead to 
transparency and corporate accountability. Such changes have the potential to further the 
sustainability agenda and support the GCC states’ desire to implement the UN SDGs and 
transition to sustainable development.    
7.2 Limitations and future research 
The low reporting rates, low adoption of the GRI and poor materiality assessment disclosures 
indicate a need for greater research into the sustainability reporting practices of organisations 
(private and public, large listed and smaller non-listed) in developing countries, especially 
those located in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. It is particularly worth exploring the 
institutional and cultural inhibitors that are causing a decline in sustainability reporting rates, 
the adoption of international standards such as the GRI, and the materiality assessment 
disclosures. Future studies should involve comparing reporters’ claims on how the materiality 
assessment was performed against how the assessment was carried out, using either survey or 
case study research methods. Researchers should also consider materiality assessment 
disclosures offered in other media, such as reporters’ websites. This study is limited to the 
examination of reporters’ materiality assessment disclosures - how they conducted their 
materiality assessments - by developing a scoring index broadly based on the GRI index. 
However, considering the significance of International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) 
and Sustainability Accounting Standard Board (SASB) literature in materiality determination, 
it is recommended for future researchers to investigate the peculiarities associated with use of 
specific standards (e.g. GRI, AccountAbility, 2018 AP1100 and IIRC) 
on materiality assessment disclosure quality. This study is limited to the identification and 
testing of four determinants of materiality assessment disclosure scores. Future researchers 
should consider the impact of other corporate characteristics, such as ownership structure, 
media coverage and gender diversity, on the quality of materiality assessment disclosures. As 
materiality assessment disclosures can be influenced by investor sentiments, it is recommended 
for future researchers to capture the nuances associated with investor sentiments. In addition, 
the cost of corporate disclosures varies directly with the quality of their information. Future 
researchers should also consider incorporating this variable in their analysis to offer a more 
nuanced discussion of corporate reporting behaviour. Finally, there is a need for more 
interpretive (qualitative) and case studies, examining the extent of managerial (and 
professional) capture in sustainability reporting practices by companies based in the GCC 
region. The potential for the materiality assessment in feeding into corporate sustainability 










Appendix A1: Examples of materiality assessment disclosures 
This section provides examples of materiality assessment disclosures that achieve scores 
ranging from one to five: 
A1.1 Materiality assessment score 1 
An example of a reporter that claims to have conducted a materiality assessment without 
providing any disclosure on the materiality assessment is Almarai (KSA) who, in its 2017 
annual report, states:  
“We aim to disclose our performance against our sustainability goals in a dedicated 
Sustainability Report that will cover 2017 and appear in 2018. We made progress in 
applying the materiality assessment process to identify issues that reflect Almarai’s 
significant economic, environmental and social impacts, or those that most influence 
the assessments and views of our stakeholders. This continuous materiality assessment 
is helping us focus on the sustainability issues that matter most and identify the critical 
issues we need to manage. Assessment of materiality will allow us to develop a strategic 
sustainability programme, with a clear road map and goals. Materiality will be the 
anchor of our sustainability strategy as we move forward” (Almarai, Annual Report, 
2017, pg 44). 
Other than the information quoted above, the reporter provides no discussion on how the 
materiality assessment was undertaken or how (in terms of criteria used) it prioritised issues 
through a materiality matrix.  
It was found that in some cases, reporters will undertake materiality assessment in one reporting 
period and then use the results of that assessment in driving the content of multiple subsequent 
reports. One example is Sabic (KSA) which refers to its 2013 materiality assessment for 
sustainability reports published in 2014, 2015 and 2017 (no sustainability report was published 
in 2016). This approach to disclosing information on the materiality assessment creates two 
issues. First, there arises a question of the frequency with which reporters undertake a 
materiality assessment (e.g. every year versus every five years) and how frequently they should 
be undertaking their materiality assessment. The challenge for regulators and standard setters 
is that each reporter is unique, and while some reporters may experience rapid internal or 
external change/s (prompting a fresh materiality assessment), others may find that their 
material issues have remained relatively stable. The latter group of reporters must be required 
to undertake an annual materiality review aimed at validating the suitability of materiality 
assessments undertaken in previous years and to disclose information about how the review 
was conducted within each sustainability report.   
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Second, reporters must ensure that if they refer to materiality assessments undertaken in 
previous reporting periods and choose not to provide information on how this was done in the 
current sustainability report, then copies of the old sustainability reports (which contain 
information on the materiality assessment) must be available online for stakeholders. For 
example, ACWA (Oman), in its 2016 sustainability report states:  
“The details of our revised materiality assessment and all other GRI reporting 
requirements have been collated into a Sustainability Supplement to enable easy 
reference. The Sustainability Supplement is an integral part of this annual performance 
report and is available from the Annual Report section of our website, 
www.acwapower.com” (ACWA, Sustainability Report, 2016, pg. 14).  
When the supplement was examined it was found that it simply contained a table of material 
issues without any discussion of how these were identified or on what basis or criteria they 
were ranked. Thus, it may be appropriate for reporters to simply reproduce their materiality 
assessment disclosures in subsequent reports, if material issues have remained relatively stable. 
A1.2 Materiality assessment score 2 
An example of a reporter that provides limited disclosure without disclosing a materiality 
matrix is Kahramaa (Qatar), which in its 2016 sustainability report gave limited information 
on its materiality assessment.  
“Identifying material sustainability issues: We engage with our stakeholders on 
various sustainability topics on an ongoing basis. In 2014, we have strengthened our 
efforts even further. At the beginning of our report development process we have 
conducted a formal materiality assessment. Our aims were to initiate the conversation 
with our various stakeholder groups around what matters to them and what they would 
like to see from KAHRAMAA, and to identify, filter, and prioritize our key 
sustainability aspects. In determining and prioritizing these areas, we considered 
whether they reflect KAHRAMAA’s most significant economic, environmental and 
social impacts, and substantially influence our stakeholders’ assessments and/or 
decisions about our organization. The content of this report has been compiled through 
discussions with KAHRAMAA’s senior management and decision-makers, as well as 
through two materiality workshops - one for internal stakeholders, including 
representatives from various departments, and another for our external stakeholder 
groups. During these workshops we were able to capture key feedback on our first 
sustainability report, and to hear directly from our audiences on their future 
expectations from KAHRAMAA. We have reviewed our most material issues already 
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identified in the previous report to assess their continuous relevance to both our 
organization and the stakeholders. We have also considered the GRI G4 Aspects list 
and have benchmarked peers to understand what they considered material and how they 
report on these topics” (Kahramaa, Sustainability Report, 2016, pg. 16). 
“During the report preparation process, we have specifically engaged a number of 
internal and external stakeholders as part of the materiality assessment. Our intent was 
to invite their perspectives and recommendations on our report and to hear from them 
regarding our most material sustainability aspects. The feedback was positive and our 
effort for the first sustainability report was highly appreciated” (Kahramaa, 
Sustainability Report, 2016, pg. 17). 
The reporter claims to develop a materiality matrix (pg. 4) but does not disclose the materiality 
matrix within the sustainability report. 
A1.3 Materiality assessment score 3 
An example of a reporter that provides limited disclosure along with a materiality matrix is 
Tasnee (KSA), which in its 2017 sustainability report states:  
“Conducted workshop on “Materiality”. Completed materiality assessment for 
identifying top Sustainability issues in TPC via engagement of internal stakeholders & 
external expert opinion” (Tasnee, Sustainability Report, 2017, page 5). 
“As part of sustainability management program, TASNEE Petrochemical Complex 
(TPC) has developed first sustainability materiality assessment by engagement of 
internal stakeholders and the external expert opinion that defines & ranks the issues and 
topics that have the highest impact on company & stakeholders. On the basis of this 
assessment TPC management selected company material topics. TPC have focused on 
the majority of topics that fell within the high importance for company and high 
importance for Stakeholders. These topics are considered to be the most important to 
our business. Sustainability management begins with identifying and defining the 
topics and issues that have the most significant impact on company’s operations and 
stakeholders” (Tasnee, Sustainability Report, 2017, page 6). 
A materiality matrix (p. 6) prioritises issues based on internal stakeholders (x-axis) and external 
stakeholders (y-axis) and identifies and prioritises 48 issues.  
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A1.4 Materiality assessment score 4 
An example of a reporter that provided comprehensive disclosure over its materiality 
assessment without providing a materiality matrix is WOQOD (Qatar), which in its 2016 
sustainability report outlined a four-step materiality assessment process (identification, 
prioritisation, validation and review)  in line with the recommendations of the GRI. However, 
a materiality matrix is missing from the discussion. Instead, the reporter simply states:  
“STEP 2: PRIORITIZATION: After considering a list of relevant topics which will be 
covered in the report which are likely to be a list containing a selection of GRI Aspects 
and GRI sector disclosures that are complemented, if needed, by other topics, the 
organization should prioritize them. This involves considering the significance of their 
economic, environmental and social impacts for their substantive influence on the 
assessments and decisions through stakeholder consultations” (WOQOD, 
Sustainability Report, 2016, pg. 26-27). 
This indicates that some reporters are perhaps unwilling to share with their stakeholders: (1) 
the issues that they identified through the materiality assessment; and (2) the criteria/basis used 
to rank/prioritise issues between material (disclosed) and immaterial (not disclosed).  
A1.5 Materiality assessment score 5 
An example of a reporter that provides comprehensive disclosure over its materiality 
assessment and a materiality matrix is Dolphin Energy (Abu Dhabi), which scored 5 for its 
2015 sustainability report. The company adopts the GRI guidelines and presents a four-step 
approach to its materiality assessment. A materiality matrix (p. 6) prioritises issues based on 
significance to Dolphin Energy (x-axis) and significance to stakeholders (y-axis) and identifies 




Appendix A2: Variables definition 
Variables Description Source 
   
Materiality Disc. 
Score 
Materiality assessment disclosure score 
captured through content analysis by scoring 
materiality assessment disclosures from zero (no 
information provided) to five (comprehensive 
disclosure in line with the GRI requirement) 
(See appendix A1 for detailed construction)  
Author’s 
compilation  
Leverage  Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Author’s calculation  
ROA Return on assets is the ratio of income before 
extraordinary items to total assets. 
Author’s calculation 
MTB Market to book ratio. Author’s calculation 
Board 
independence 
Percentage of independent director to total 





Governance score takes values from 0 to 100 








World Governance Indicators that captures 
perception of the extent to which country’ 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, 




World Governance Indicators that captures 
perceptions of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development 
World Bank 
GD Growth Capture growth of county’s economy  World Bank 
Ln.GDP The natural logarithm of gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita. 
World Bank  
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Table 1: Sustainability reporting across sample of listed GCC companies 
Country 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Grand Total 
Abu Dhabi 18 21 23 22 26 110 
Bahrain 17 21 22 24 23 107 
Dubai 15 13 19 25 27 99 
Kuwait 28 32 35 63 64 222 
Oman 26 30 32 36 39 163 
Qatar 19 24 24 26 24 117 
KSA 54 59 67 73 76 329 
Grand Total 177 200 222 269 279 1147 
 
Table 2: Materiality assessment disclosure score 
Description Score 
No reference made to a materiality assessment.  0 
The reporter claims to have undertaken a materiality assessment but provides 
no information on the steps adopted. 
1 
Limited information provided on the steps of the materiality assessment. 
However, no materiality matrix is provided to sustainability report users. 
2 
Limited information provided on the steps of the materiality assessment and a 
materiality matrix is provided. 
3 
Comprehensive disclosure provided on the steps of the materiality assessment. 
However, no materiality matrix is provided. 
4 
Comprehensive disclosure provided on the steps of the materiality assessment 














Table 3: Sustainability reporters across countries 
Listed Company 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Abu Dhabi 70 18 26% 21 30% 23 33% 22 31% 26 37% 
Bahrain 44 17 39% 21 48% 22 50% 24 55% 23 52% 
Dubai 76 15 20% 13 17% 19 25% 25 33% 27 36% 
Kuwait 176 28 16% 32 18% 35 20% 63 36% 64 36% 
Oman 116 26 22% 30 26% 32 28% 36 31% 39 34% 
Qatar 46 19 41% 24 52% 24 52% 26 57% 24 52% 
KSA 176 54 31% 59 34% 67 38% 73 41% 76 43% 
Grand Total 704 177  200  222  269  279  
Note: This Table provides an assessment of ‘Sustainability Reporters’ among GCC countries. ‘Sustainability Reporters’ (SR) assessment, is based 
on a dichotomous scale; i.e. ‘1’, if a company discloses sustainability-related information in its annual reports or standalone sustainability reports 
and ‘0’ otherwise.  
 
 
Table 4: Sustainability reporters across industries 
 Listed Firms 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Construction 7 1 14% 1 14% 2 29% 2 29% 2 29% 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 354 98 28% 103 29% 115 32% 145 41% 147 42% 
Manufacturing 209 40 19% 50 24% 54 26% 68 33% 75 36% 
Mining 19 1 5% 1 5% 1 5% 3 16% 5 26% 
Retail Trade 6 0 0% 0 0% 1 17% 2 33% 1 17% 
Services 80 20 25% 30 38% 32 40% 31 39% 30 38% 
Transportation & Public Utilities 29 17 59% 15 52% 17 59% 18 62% 19 66% 
Grand Total 704 177 25% 200 28% 222 32% 269 38% 279 40% 
Note: This Table provides an industry wise assessment of ‘Sustainability Reporters’ among GCC countries. ‘Sustainability Reporters’ (SR) 
assessment, is based on a dichotomous scale; i.e. ‘1’, if a company discloses sustainability-related information in its annual reports or standalone 
sustainability reports and ‘0’ otherwise. 
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Table 5: Overview of GRI and Materiality Assessment Disclosure 
  Panel A: GRI 
Adoption  
Rates 
Panel B: Materiality 
assessment Rates 
Panel C: Materiality 
assessment 
disclosure scores 







18 5 27.8% 3 16.7% 7 2.33 
Bahrain 17 1 5.9% 1 5.9% 2 2.00 
Dubai 15 3 20.0% 3 20.0% 7 2.33 
Kuwait 28 3 10.7% 2 7.1% 5 2.50 
Muscat 26 4 15.4% 4 15.4% 10 2.50 
Qatar 19 2 10.5% 1 5.3% 2 2.00 
KSA 54 3 5.6% 4 7.4% 10 2.50 
Total 177 21 11.9% 18 10.2% 43 2.39 
  Panel A: GRI 
Adoption  
Rates 
Panel B: Materiality 
assessment Rates 









21 4 19.0% 3 14.3% 11 3.67 
Bahrain 21 1 4.8% 1 4.8% 3 3.00 
Dubai 13 2 15.4% 2 15.4% 5 2.50 
Kuwait 32 2 6.3% 1 3.1% 3 3.00 
Muscat 30 4 13.3% 4 13.3% 12 3.00 
Qatar 24 5 20.8% 3 12.5% 9 3.00 
KSA 59 4 6.8% 3 5.1% 8 2.67 
Total 200 22 11.0% 17 8.5% 51 3.00 
 
 
Panel A: GRI 
Adoption  
Rates 
Panel B: Materiality 
assessment Rates 









23 2 8.7% 2 8.7% 5 2.50 
Bahrain 22 1 4.5% 1 4.5% 3 3.00 
Dubai 19 3 15.8% 3 15.8% 9 3.00 
Kuwait 35 2 5.7% 2 5.7% 4 2.00 
Muscat 32 5 15.6% 5 15.6% 15 3.00 
Qatar 24 4 16.7% 3 12.5% 7 2.33 
KSA 67 4 6.0% 4 6.0% 9 2.25 
Total 222 21 9.5% 20 9.0% 52 2.60 
 
 
Panel A: GRI 
Adoption  
Rates 
Panel B: Materiality 
assessment Rates 









22 4 18.2% 3 13.6% 12 4.00 
Bahrain 24 2 8.3% 2 8.3% 6 3.00 
Dubai 25 3 12.0% 3 12.0% 7 2.33 
Kuwait 63 4 6.3% 4 6.3% 7 1.75 
Muscat 36 3 8.3% 3 8.3% 9 3.00 
Qatar 26 4 15.4% 3 11.5% 12 4.00 
KSA 73 4 5.5% 3 4.1% 7 2.33 





Panel A: GRI 
Adoption  
Rates 
Panel B: Materiality 
assessment Rates 









26 3 11.5% 3 11.5% 13 4.33 
Bahrain 23 2 8.7% 2 8.7% 6 3.00 
Dubai 27 3 11.1% 3 11.1% 8 2.67 
Kuwait 64 2 3.1% 2 3.1% 6 3.00 
Muscat 39 3 7.7% 3 7.7% 13 4.33 
Qatar 24 4 16.7% 3 12.5% 11 3.67 
KSA 76 6 7.9% 8 10.5% 17 2.50 
Total 279 23 8.2% 24 8.6% 74 3.08 
Note: This table provides a summary of the GRI adoption rates, Materiality assessment 
disclosure rate and Materiality assessment disclosure scores among sustainability reporters 
over the five-year period of analysis. Panel A: shows the SR column provides the sum of 
sustainability reports, the GRI column indicates the sum of the GRI adoption rates, and the 
% column shows the percentage of companies following GRI among sustainability reporters. 
Note that the GRI adoption rates are based on a dichotomous scale; i.e. ‘1’ if the sustainability 
report provides reference to the GRI and ‘0’ otherwise. Panel B provides a summary of 
materiality assessment disclosure (MAD) rates among sustainability reporters over the five-
year period of analysis. The MAD column indicates the sum of materiality assessment 
disclosures identified in sustainability reports, and the % column shows the percentage of 
sustainability reports providing some information on materiality assessment. The MAD is 
based on a dichotomous scale; i.e. ‘1’, if a sustainability report provides some information 
on the materiality assessment and ‘0’ otherwise.  Panel C provides a summary of the 
materiality assessment (MA) scores for sustainability reporters over the five-year period of 
analysis. The MAS column provides the sum of MA scores, and the Avg.MAS column shows 
the average materiality assessment score. The MAS is calculated based on the materiality 




Table 6: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
      
Materiality Disc. Score  100 1.486 1.600 0.000 5 
Leverage 100 0.627 1.078 -6.500 5.125 
ROA 100 0.129 0.325 -0.065 2.364 
MTB 100 1.660 1.240 0.261 11.786 
Company size 100 22.521 2.289 15.226 26.581 
Board independence 100 23.074 29.025 0.000 100 
CG Quality 100 61.886 20.016 16.000 93.853 
Voice & Accountability Index 100 15.456 7.670 2.817 30.542 
Regulatory Quality 100 68.037 11.12 48.558 82.692 
GDP growth 100 2.940 1.939 -4.70 5.4 
Ln GDP 100 11.396 0.398 10.493 11.879 
 




Table 7: Pairwise correlations 
  
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) Leverage 1.000 
(2) ROA -0.015 1.000 
(3) MTB 0.074 0.105 1.000 
(4) Company size 0.009 0.276*** 0.314*** 1.000 
(5) B.IND -0.046 0.044 0.055 0.169** 1.000 
(6) CG Quality 0.159* -0.010 -0.025 0.021 0.360*** 1.000 
(7) Voice & Accountability -0.121* -0.252*** -0.066 -0.345*** -0.250*** -0.204** 1.000 
(8) Regulatory Quality  -0.052 -0.192** -0.038 -0.131* -0.041 -0.306*** 0.428*** 1.000 
(9) GDP growth 0.014 -0.056 -0.072 -0.068 0.056 -0.231** -0.065 0.407*** 1.000 
(10) ln GDP 0.076 0.191** 0.185** 0.663*** -0.053 0.159* -0.506*** -0.225*** -0.053 1.000 




Table 8:  Regression results of corporate characteristics and materiality assessment 
disclosure 
 
 Fixed Effect Ordered Logic  Poisson 
Regression 
Variables  DV: Materiality assessment disclosure Score 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Leverage -0.605** -0.755*** -0.199** 
 (0.281) (0.284) (0.0783) 
ROA 0.080** 0.121*** 0.246** 
 (0.037) (0.0430) (0.124) 
MTB -0.050 0.0979 0.000515 
 (0.374) (0.407) (0.00223) 
Company size 0.082 0.144 -0.0465 
 (0.164) (0.220) (0.0769) 
Board independence 0.014 0.0434*** 0.00963** 
 (0.010) (0.0160) (0.00427) 
Governance Quality 0.035*** 0.0586*** 0.0142*** 
 (0.013) (0.0181) (0.00542) 
Voice and Accountability Index  0.127** 0.0368** 
  (0.0598) (0.0176) 
Regulatory Quality  0.0370 0.0247 
  (0.0296) (0.0169) 
GDP growth  0.128 0.00625 
  (0.146) (0.0467) 
Ln GDP  -2.612** -0.555* 
  (1.211) (0.317) 
Constant -3.374 23.19* 6.355* 
 (3.692) (12.84) (3.474) 
F-stat p-value 0.002 0.000 0.006 
Year Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.158 0.250 0.056 
Observations 100 100 100 
Note: This table presents the regression result of Materiality assessment disclosure Score and 
Corporate Characteristics using fixed effect Fixed Effect Ordered Logic and Poisson 
Regression estimation approach. Industry and years control are included in all estimation. The 
robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis and ***, **, * show significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% level. 
 
